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Abstract 
Fighting has been a centerpiece of the National Hockey League since it was formed in 
1917.  Although rules have been introduced regulating the physicality of play in the 
NHL, fighting is demanded—and encouraged—by fans and players alike.  Fans have 
long been attracted to the violence of professional hockey; previous studies have 
documented that professional hockey is a “blood sport” that generates revenues with 
violence.  This research investigates the effect of fighting on player salaries in the NHL, 
examining the way in which fighting has become a strategic element of the game, 
describing the way players enforce their own “Code” of hockey rules and police the ice in 
ways referees cannot, and comparing the salaries of fighters and skilled players to 
determine how players in different roles are valued.     
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1.  Introduction 
Despite taking three punches to the head and being thrown to the ice without so much as a swing 
at his opponent, Maxime Talbot of the Pittsburgh Penguins was satisfied.  Finding his team down 
3-0 against the Philadelphia Flyers, Talbot goaded Flyer Daniel Carcillo into a fight early in the 
second period of the teams’ game six meeting on April 25, 2009 in the first best-of-seven round 
of the Stanley Cup Playoffs.  After the fight, the Penguins scored five unanswered goals.  The 
Penguins won the game 5-3, and eliminated the Flyers from the playoffs (ESPN NHL). 
 
Talbot is what’s known as an agitator in the National Hockey League (NHL)—a player whose 
role is to get under the skin of opposing players and draw penalties to give his team an edge.  It 
also means engaging in fights.  Win or lose, fighting has the potential to change the momentum 
of the game.  Was Talbot’s fight the main reason the Penguins won game six against the Flyers? 
 Probably not.  Did it jumpstart the Penguins’ comeback?  Undoubtedly. 
 
The presence of fighting in hockey is often a polarizing topic.  Some fans watch hockey solely 
for the violence; others condemn the sport for its unique leniency on the issue.  What frequently 
goes overlooked, however, is the strategy surrounding fighting in the National Hockey League.  
 
There are many instances in which the aggressive nature of hockey affects managerial decisions. 
 By examining available data about player salaries (determined by owners and managers), we 
will analyze how central fighting is to the decision-making processes that occur off the ice in the 
NHL.   
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2.  The Development and Strategy of Fighting in the NHL 
2.1  The History and Development of Fighting in the NHL 
The NHL was established in 1917, and was known from the beginning for its physical 
brutality.  The original rules were significantly different from the rules today, and 
violence was actually more common and less regulated.  Over the years, the NHL 
gradually introduced more and more rules designed to temper the brutality of the sport:  
the league’s intent is to allow for the physical nature of the game, but not at the expense 
of player safety.  The first key change occurred in 1918, when the two blue lines were 
introduced.  These lines divided the ice into three sections:  two defensive zones on each 
end and a neutral zone in the middle.  Initially, passing the puck was only allowed in the 
neutral zone, which meant that when a player had the puck in either of the other zones, he 
had to skate through walls of fists, elbows, high sticks, and outstretched skates, rather 
than pass.  This style of hockey was extremely dangerous and led to many injuries 
(Bernstein 2006, 3-4). 
 
Rather than ban violence outright, the NHL tried to regulate it.  In 1922, the league 
introduced Rule 56, punishing players who engaged in fights with a five-minute penalty.  
Owners, in the meantime, recognized that fans were attracted by violence, and 
encouraged the physical type of play that became engrained in hockey culture.  Managers 
soon recognized the need to protect their most skilled players from the violence that was 
becoming dominant, and created the role of the enforcer to police the game and protect 
their star players (Bernstein 2006, 4).  
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What exactly did enforcers enforce?  The Code.  Hockey games were ruled not only by 
the official rules, but also by an unspoken code.  This Code—which includes the 
principle that players have to answer for delivering big hits and taking cheap shots at 
opponents—became an integral part of hockey.  Enforcers began to use fighting to 
intimidate opponents and deter them from hitting and checking (either legally or illegally) 
the team’s stars.  Marty McSorley, nicknamed “Wayne Gretzky’s Bodyguard” for his role 
protecting Gretzky when both played for the Los Angeles Kings, described his task as 
one of the league’s most feared enforcers:  “As an enforcer, it was my job to make sure 
that my teammates had space out on the ice and could play the game honestly.  If 
opposing players wanted to take liberties with my guys, then they would have to answer 
to me.  That kept things honest, and that is the basis of the Code in its purest sense” 
(Bernstein 2006, x). 
 
Enforcers have persisted in the league because of their success protecting teammates.  
Glen Sonmor summed up the effects of adhering to the Code, saying “When I was 
coaching the North Stars I also found it difficult to get my guys to even check Gretzky 
out there because they knew that as soon as they did they were going to have to turn 
around and face his bodyguards, McSorley or Semenko” (Bernstein 2006, 11). 
 
It is worth noting that the NHL is the only major hockey league to allow—and to actually 
encourage—fighting.  Fighting is prohibited in European hockey leagues and in Olympic 
ice hockey (International Ice Hockey Federation).  While not prohibited in collegiate 
hockey in the US, it is strongly discouraged:  fighting players are disqualified from the 
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game in which they fight and are suspended for the following number of games equal to 
their total number of fighting penalties that season.   As a result, players tend not to take 
on the role of enforcer until they reach the NHL.  George Parros, now an enforcer for the 
Anaheim Ducks, was a skilled forward when he played collegiate hockey at Princeton.  
He became an enforcer when he realized he wasn’t talented enough to make it in the 
NHL as a goal-scorer; he led the league in fights in the 2010-2011 season with twenty-
seven.   
 
The lack of fighting in other leagues is part of the reason that enforcers need to establish 
themselves early on in the NHL.  Much of an enforcer’s success is due to his reputation, 
and a player cannot build a reputation as an enforcer until he reaches the NHL.  The 
longevity of an enforcer’s NHL career requires that he participate in fights early and 
often.  This allows us to identify enforcers as players who fought frequently during the 
previous season for the purposes of this study. 
 
2.2  Fighting Strategy:  Profit Maximization for the Teams 
Team owners typically have two goals:  revenues and success (measured by wins and—in 
particular—by Stanley Cup appearances).  Fighting has become engrained in the NHL 
because of its impact on both these goals.  Essentially, the continued fighting helps team 
owners maximize profits.  (Think of the way that new technology—although not directly 
related to a business’s goal or output—often helps the business increase its profits by 
improving or accelerating the process the business uses to produce products, or by 
decreasing the costs of production.)  Because a team’s success increases revenues from 
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both ticket sales and merchandising, when fighting boosts a team’s on-ice performance, it 
drives profits up as well.  Below is a more detailed explanation of the way fighting 
impacts revenues, both directly (through sales and merchandising) and indirectly 
(through improving performance).  
 
2.21  Fighting and Revenues 
From the start, owners of NHL teams recognized that fans enjoyed the violence of 
hockey games.  In fact, in the 1920s, when hockey came to New York City, 
Madison Square Garden promoter Tex Rickard recognized that people flocked to 
boxing events, and realized that he could use the public’s delight in brutality to 
market hockey.  He hired ambulances to drive through Manhattan with their 
sirens on, and pull up outside Madison Square Garden before a hockey game 
started, appearing to wait for the inevitable serious player injuries (Bernstein 
2006, 4-5). 
 
Though owners have long made the connection between fighting and ticket sales, 
two studies during the 1990s proved the connection statistically.  These studies 
found that in the United States, “fighting” teams that played an aggressive style of 
hockey and commonly engaged in fights had significantly higher attendance rates 
than “skating” teams that tended to avoid on-ice violence.  (These studies are 
explained in more detail in the following section.) 
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Besides increasing revenues through ticket sales, enforcers reduce costs by acting 
as insurance policies for more highly-paid skilled players.  Because enforcers 
deter opponents from hitting star players, the stars suffer fewer injuries.  Fighting 
is thus a cost-effective strategy:  in addition to signing enforcers at lower salaries 
than those paid to stars, owners use enforcers to ensure that their highly-paid 
teammates suffer fewer injuries and have the time and the space to make the most 
of their abilities. 
 
2.22  Fighting Strategies and Wins 
The ability of enforcers to create time and space for skilled players leads to the 
strategy behind fighting in the NHL.  As in any sport, hockey teams use different 
player roles to execute different strategies.  In the NHL, teams can dress eighteen 
skaters each game:  twelve forwards and six defensemen.  Teams are allowed five 
skaters on the ice, and these are typically three forwards (right wing, center, and 
left wing) and two defenders.  The eighteen skaters dressed for each game are 
organized accordingly.  A team’s defensemen form three defensive pairings, 
while forwards form four “lines” of three.  The defensive pairings are typically 
ranked according to the skill of the players, but each of the forward lines has a 
significantly different role, based on strategies developed around fighting and 
physical play.  
 
The first line usually includes the best offensive players on a team; it is 
responsible for the majority of a team’s scoring.  The second line contains the 
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second-tier offensive players; it supplements the first line’s point generation.  
Coaches often move individual players between the first and second lines 
throughout the season, trying to find the best combinations of players with 
complementary abilities.  For example, a playmaker (a player who excels at 
setting up goal-scoring opportunities for his teammates) needs to play with goal-
scorers who can take advantage of the opportunities the playmaker supplies.   
 
Physicality and fighting come into play on the third and fourth lines.  The third 
line is commonly known as the checking line, and is usually composed of 
defensive-minded forwards; it plays against the opposing team’s first and second 
lines to limit their scoring and wear them down physically.  The fourth line is the 
“energy” line; energy-line players are usually older players whose scoring 
potential has diminished, but who play extremely physical and aggressive hockey.  
An energy line usually gets little ice time, but plays in bursts of high-octane 
aggression that often lead to fighting.  Enforcers often appear on checking or 
energy lines. 
 
Although enforcers are the primary participants in fights in the NHL, another 
player role is often responsible for fighting throughout the season:  agitators.  
Agitators (also known as pests) are players who antagonize opponents either 
through physical play or verbal taunting—often both.  They use legal, illegal, and 
questionable tactics to do this, frequently committing penalties when the refs are 
not watching.  Their goal is to goad opponents into committing penalties; they 
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often try to lure opponents into fights and then back off so that only the opponent 
gets a penalty.  As a result of their playing style, agitators are often required to 
answer for their tactics and uphold the Code by fighting.  Agitators and enforcers 
thus have different roles, but both types of players commonly participate in fights. 
 
The third and fourth lines use physical play to accomplish two key goals:  
invigorating their teammates and wearing down opponents.  Their aggressive play 
(checking any and all of the opposing team they can) is often used to swing 
momentum and energize the rest of the team.  The physical play livens up the fans 
in attendance, which—in turn—can give a boost to the home team’s players.  
Fighting also tends to re-energize both the teams and the crowd.  As a result, 
fighting has the potential to impact a game by changing its momentum.  Even the 
prospect of having to fight a team’s enforcer causes opponents to give the 
enforcer’s teammates more time and space on the ice, making it easier to score 
goals and win games. 
 
2.3  Choosing When to Fight 
What affects a player’s decision to fight?  There are a few main reasons players challenge 
opponents to a fight.  The first is justice.  Enforcers are there to protect teammates:  if a 
skilled player is checked hard (especially if it was an illegal, or questionable, hit), the 
enforcers on that player’s team will challenge his attacker to a fight.  Second, players 
fight to re-energize their team.  Many players (sometimes skilled players) will fight when 
their team is playing poorly and is losing.  The goal is to send a message to teammates to 
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work harder and get back in the game.  Finally, many fights occur simply because of 
rivalries.  Both individual and team rivalries lead to many fights, including some at the 
start of the game, simply to set the tone. 
 
A typical fight in hockey involves a challenge from one player and an acceptance from 
his opponent, followed by both players “dropping the gloves.”  What causes a player to 
accept a fight?  The Code.  When a challenge is issued to uphold the Code, a player is 
expected to fight to answer for his earlier aggression.  In other instances, a player might 
choose to accept the challenge, or might merely skate away.  A major factor to consider 
before accepting a challenge is the state of the game.  Because many fights are attempts 
to re-invigorate the losing team, a player on the winning team might skate away because 
he doesn’t want to provide an opportunity for a shift in momentum.  (The Talbot-Carcillo 
fight mentioned in the introduction to this paper was a fight of this nature.  Carcillo’s 
willingness to accept the fight and give Talbot and the Penguins a chance to swing the 
momentum was questioned by the game’s commentators for this very reason.) 
 
3.  Literature Review 
Though many view fighting in hockey merely as excessive violence, we will demonstrate the 
complex effect of fighting on financial decisions.  Fighting in hockey in the United States has 
been studied before by Jones, Ferguson, and Stewart (1993, 1996), though these studies have 
focused on the relationship between fighting and attendance revenues, not specifically on the 
impact of a player’s fighting role.  We will bring together information from studies about the 
financial importance of fighting in the NHL, and information from studies of managerial and 
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coaching decision-making in other sports leagues (specifically the National Football League, the 
NFL) to examine the effect of fighting on player salaries in the NHL. 
 
Two studies by Jones, Ferguson, and Stewart (1993, 1996) demonstrate the link between fighting 
and financial returns on hockey teams.  These studies show the financial factors in the valuations 
managers place (or should place) on players such as agitators and enforcers.  While the studies 
don’t answer the questions we are asking, the results are pertinent to player salary 
determinations.  Managers have two goals:  1) create a winning team, and 2) maximize profits.  
Players that help accomplish either of these goals (or both) become more valuable to the team. 
Jones, Ferguson, and Stewart (1993) focus on a number of variables believed to affect game 
attendance, including the price of tickets, the league ranking of the specific teams playing, the 
playoff drive of each team, and the “violence” of each team.  Violence was incorporated as the 
average number of penalty minutes for each team prior to the game in question.  The penalties 
were then broken into minor penalties, major penalties, and game misconducts.  (“Fighting” is a 
five-minute major penalty in the NHL, and aggressors are sometimes given ten-minute game 
misconducts as well.)  They also divided the study between games played in Canada and games 
played in the US.  Jones, Ferguson, and Stewart regressed game attendance on these variables.  
The results categorized hockey in the US as a “blood sport:”  as violence increases, so do ticket 
sales.  In Canada, however, ticket sales actually decrease with a rise in extreme violence such as 
fighting. 
 
Jones and Stewart (1996) single out fighting from other penalties.  They also examine the 
playing styles of individual teams, categorizing each team as a “skating” or a “fighting” team, 
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based on its reputation for skilled or physical play.  From this, they identify individual games as 
being between two skating teams, two fighting teams, or between one skating team and one 
fighting team.  The results support their previous study which found that fighting has a 
significant, positive impact on ticket sales in the US, where games that include a fighting team 
are better attended than those between two skating teams.  Canadian audiences still seemed to 
dislike violence.   
 
Both prior studies highlight the financial value of enforcers and agitators for a professional 
hockey team.  When choosing players for their teams, managers must consider the cost of their 
investment (player salary) and the return on their investment.  The return on investment can be 
measured using both immediate financial returns (such as a change in ticket sales and 
merchandising revenue) and long-term financial gains based on performance (Will the team win 
the Stanley Cup, ultimately driving up ticket sales and merchandising revenue?).  Jones and 
Stewart (1993, 1996) thus reveal that fighting should factor in the valuations managers place on 
different players.   
 
The Jones and Stewart studies link hockey fighting and financial return but do not address 
managerial decisions at the draft, something that has not been studied in the NHL.  However, 
managerial profit-based draft decisions have been studied extensively in the National Football 
League.  Moskowitz and Wertheim (2011) focused on player value during professional sports 
drafts:  they studied the trades teams conducted in order to get higher positioning in the draft, the 
salaries awarded to different draft picks, and the performances of draft picks during their NFL 
careers.  They concluded that high draft picks are most often overvalued; the disparity in 
 12 
performance between players chosen in different rounds of the draft was not proportional to their 
difference in salary.  In fact, Moskowitz and Wertheim suggested that the risks facing a team 
with any given player (injury, team compatibility, and other factors affecting performance) make 
the high salaries paid to top draft picks unreasonable.  Instead, teams should “trade down” with 
high draft picks to receive multiple players for a similar total salary (since the chances of one of 
two players becoming a star are greater than the chances of one of one).  The similarities of the 
NFL and NHL drafts make the Moskowitz and Wertheim results pertinent.  If the highly-touted 
goal scorers that dominate the first rounds of the NHL draft demand salaries many times those of 
their gritty teammates, skilled players might well be overvalued relative to enforcers. 
 
What about the decisions facing coaches about when to play their enforcers?  Again, coaching 
decisions have been studied in the NFL and not in the NHL.  Moskowitz and Wertheim provide 
some insight into this issue through the NFL.  Questioning the validity of the oft-used sports 
motto “There’s no I in team,” they compared the success of teams composed of one superstar 
with “serviceable” support with that of teams composed entirely of “solid” players.  They 
identified such teams by looking at salary disparities across individual teams.  They found that 
teams with higher salary disparities across their starters are more likely to reach championships 
than those with more even salary distributions.  In the NHL specifically, teams without a star 
goal-scorer or goalie dropped out of the playoffs quickly.  What can we extrapolate about 
fighting from this?  Enforcers are expected both to protect their own teammates and to intimidate 
their opponents.  An enforcer’s ability to keep his own team’s goal scorers worry-free and to 
force opposing stars to play tentatively might be the deciding factor in a hockey game.  However, 
an enforcer’s abilities are not directly reflected in player statistics.  As a result, we cannot simply 
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look at an enforcer’s goal-scoring ability to determine his appropriate salary.  Moskowitz’s and 
Wertheim’s results reveal the need to look at enforcers and skilled players separately when 
examining player statistics to determine an appropriate player valuation. 
 
There are a few studies that have examined salary determinants in the NHL.  Although these 
studies have focused on identifying potential discrimination affecting player salaries, the results 
offer a benchmark of comparison for this study—as well as an opportunity to expand upon prior 
research.  Jones and Walsh (1988) looked at a number of factors affecting player salaries in the 
NHL, examining how different skill sets impacted player valuations, particularly across players 
in different positions.  They used regression analysis to accomplish this, regressing player 
salaries on a number of standard statistics such as games played, games played squared (the 
coefficient of games played squared would reveal whether players could have too much 
experience; if they could be “over the hill”), penalty minutes, height, and weight.  To assess 
whether salary discrimination existed against French-Canadian NHL players (because many 
former French-Canadian NHL-ers have complained of discrimination), Jones and Walsh also 
included a dummy variable for players born in the province of Quebec.   
 
As a result of their study, Jones and Walsh posited two theories pertinent to the topic of our 
study.  First, the positive coefficient for penalty minutes for forwards—compared to a negative 
coefficient for defenders—suggests that the NHL pays more for enforcers at a forward position.  
In the Jones and Walsh study, penalty minutes represented a player’s level of aggression—
aggressive players are more likely to incur penalty minutes, be it accidental or intentional.  
Second, Jones and Walsh returned a statistically-significant negative coefficient for the French-
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Canadian dummy variable in their regressions for defensemen.  They concluded that all other 
attributes being equal, French-Canadian defensemen had salaries ten percent lower than those of 
their peers.  However, Jones and Walsh used data from the 1977-1978 season, so while their 
conclusion might indicate discrimination, it is possible that such discrimination is no longer seen 
in player salaries in the NHL.  Additionally, as Jones and Walsh note, the plus-minus statistic 
was not recorded by the NHL prior to the 1977-1978 season.  Since plus-minus has become a 
prevalent way of measuring a defender’s ability, it is possible that the addition of the plus-minus 
variable to a regression analysis of player salaries will yield different results and have different 
implications about salary discrimination in the NHL. 
 
The results presented in Jones’ and Walsh’s study raise additional questions.  If enforcers at the 
forward position are paid a premium, what determines their salaries?  Skilled players typically 
see higher salaries as their goals and assists increase, and lower salaries the more they are 
penalized.  (Teams would rather their goal scorers spend time on the ice and not in the penalty 
box.)  In addition, enforcers tend to score fewer goals than their teammates.  To truly compare 
player salaries, it is necessary to look at the effect of different factors on the salaries of skilled 
players and enforcers to see which variables are more pertinent to each player’s valuation.  For 
example, height and weight might be more relevant in selecting an enforcer whose role is to 
intimidate and fight opponents than in choosing a skilled player, whose physical size might not 
have a profound impact on his ability to score goals.  If we can examine the value of enforcers in 
more depth, the perceptions of discrimination become more interesting:  if there does exist a 
premium for enforcers, is it possible that French-Canadian players tend not to be enforcers, 
thereby explaining—at least in part—the disparity in salaries for French Canadians?   
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Lavoie (2000) followed up Jones’ and Walsh’s study, trying to determine factors that explain the 
lower salaries of French-Canadian NHL players.  Lavoie hypothesized that factors such as team 
location could explain such prejudice:  the tensions between English Canada and French Canada 
could make English Canadian teams less interested in French Canadian players because 
managers fear that a heavily French Canadian team will attract fewer fans and lead to lower 
revenues.  Lavoie’s results were tentative (sometimes the signs of coefficients were opposite 
from what Lavoie expected or were not statistically significant), and suggested a different reason 
for the discrepancy.  Lavoie’s regression analysis suggested that management, potentially under 
the pressure of local fans, tends to pay a premium for local players.  Since there are fewer teams 
located in French-Canadian cities and provinces than in the rest of Canada or in the US, French-
Canadian players don’t typically fall into the category of “local” talent and therefore miss out on 
the premium that managers pay for locals. 
 
However, Lavoie (2003) expanded upon the results of his first paper, analyzing the merits that 
teams recognize in rookie players at the NHL draft.  Lavoie (2003) found that European players 
typically do not suffer the same salary discrimination experienced by French-Canadian players, 
suggesting that his prior explanation of managers paying for local players does not explain the 
discrepancy.  In addition, Lavoie added other variables to assess the playing style of individual 
players, incorporating height, weight, and penalty-minutes-per-game into his regression analysis.  
He also included a variable designed to identify the defensive ability of players (something 
typically underrepresented in player statistics) by creating a dummy variable for forwards who 
are often utilized on penalty kill units.  (When a player commits a penalty, he spend two minutes 
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in the penalty box and his team remains down a player for that period of time.  This period is 
called the “power play” for the team with the one-man advantage and the “penalty kill” for the 
perpetrator’s team.  Teams have designated power play and penalty kill units; forwards who 
appear on their team’s penalty kill units are usually viewed as having strong defensive play.)  
The results of Lavoie’s study suggested that defensive capabilities were not responsible for the 
salary discrimination against French-Canadian players; the players were simply undervalued by 
teams at the NHL draft.  Like Jones and Walsh, Lavoie’s results might be explained by the data 
he used:  he looked at data up until 1994.  It is worth exploring the possibility that discrimination 
has disappeared in the seventeen years since Lavoie’s study. 
 
To expand on the work of Jones, Walsh, and Lavoie, this study will specifically distinguish 
between enforcers and skilled players.  An enforcer’s defensive ability, for example, stems from 
intimidation:  opposing skilled players tend to play more tentatively against aggressive enforcers, 
lowering their potential to score.  However, since enforcers rarely have the skating ability and 
skill set to be considered defensive players, they do not appear on penalty kill units and would 
not have been recognized by Lavoie for their defensive contribution.  Enforcers’ strengths are 
typically intangible, and are therefore overlooked by standard regression analysis that groups all 
players together.  To compensate for this, we will examine enforcers and skilled players as 
separate groups at the forward and defender positions.  A direct comparison of the way different 
variables impact both enforcers and skilled players should explicitly reveal what factors have 
more weight in determining the salaries of both types of players.  This, in turn, can be used to re-
assess the possible reasons for the perceived discrimination towards French-Canadian players.  
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4.  Methodology 
Determining the effect of fighting on player valuations in the NHL requires a method for valuing 
players.  The market value of hockey players can be measured different ways.  How does a 
player impact a team’s ticket sales and merchandising revenue?  How many goals does a player 
score in a season?  How does a player improve the performance of his teammates?  Some of 
these impacts are measureable, but many of the values that enforcers and agitators bring to a 
hockey team are intangible.  As a result, we need to pick a tangible way to measure a player’s 
value.  For the purposes of this study, we used two measures:  salary and time on ice.  Based on 
the availability of salary information for current players, we can create a direct numerical 
comparison between the value of enforcers and the value of skilled players.  Jones, Walsh, and 
Lavoie also used player salaries to analyze potential discrimination in the NHL.  This allows us 
to compare the results of our analysis with their results to look for commonalities, and to identify 
the most appropriate explanation for the perceptions of discrimination reported by Jones, Walsh, 
and Lavoie.  Time on ice will give us insight into the strategic value of different variables on 
enforcers and skilled players.  Time on ice data (a player’s average total time on the ice per 
game) is available for all players from the previous season.  
 
To assess what factors impact a player’s salary and average time on ice, we will regress them on 
points-per-game, games played, penalty minutes, plus-minus (a measure of how many goals are 
scored for a player’s team while he is on the ice minus the number scored against his team), 
height, and weight.  The regressions will not only reveal whether certain factors are “statistically 
significant” (Is there a clear impact on a player’s salary or playing time?), but will also quantify 
the impact of certain variables on player valuation.  We can then compare the results between 
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enforcers and agitators and skilled players.  (We will also divide players into two groups—
forwards and defenders—as different skill sets are needed for these different positions.)  If 
enforcers and agitators have different determinants for their salaries and ice times, we can 
identify ways teams measure the intangible value that physical play brings to hockey.  In 
addition, some variables might be statistically significant for one group of players and not the 
other (or for salary determination, but not time on ice), demonstrating that certain variables have 
a different impact on a player’s salary and ice time depending upon his role.  
 
After determining the impact of fighting on player salaries, we hope to use our findings to 
expand upon the studies conducted by Jones and Walsh (1988) and Lavoie (2002, 2003).  Jones, 
Walsh, and Lavoie concluded that French-Canadians in the NHL are discriminated against in 
salaries.  If our results reveal that enforcers and agitators earn larger salaries relative to their 
goal-scoring and defensive abilities in order to compensate for their intangible “violence” value, 
we can examine the distribution of French-Canadian enforcers across the league.  If French 
Canadians tend not to incorporate the physical aspects of hockey into their game, the value of 
fighters might account for the lower salaries paid to French Canadian players.   
 
Moreover, we can follow up the studies of Jones, Ferguson, and Stewart (1993, 1996) suggesting 
that US audiences are more attracted to physical play than Canadian audiences.  By comparing 
the salaries of enforcers playing for Canadian teams with those playing for American teams, we 
can see if the ability of enforcers to increase ticket sales through violence is reflected in a 
disparity in salaries for teams in different locations. 
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5.  Data  
5.1 Players 
Hockey players included in this study were current players who have played at least 50 
games in their NHL careers.  Only current players were included for three reasons.  First, 
salary data came from the National Hockey League’s Players’ Association (NHLPA), and 
player salaries were not available for older seasons.  Second, salaries of NHL players 
have changed drastically over the years.  Salaries have changed not only in response to 
inflation and changes in revenue streams, but also as a result of changes in salary 
regulations.  The NHL enforces a salary cap for each team, limiting the amount of money 
teams can invest in players.  Changes in the salary cap affect the maximum salaries that 
teams are allowed to offer their players, making comparisons between salaries from 
different years less significant.  Finally, the NHL has been subject to many changes in 
playing style and rules since its inception.  In particular, the NHL lockout that occurred 
during the 2004-2005 season sparked a number of changes designed to increase the 
popularity of hockey in the US.  Rule changes—including smaller pads for goalies and 
bigger goals—were enacted to increase the number of goals scored, making it difficult to 
compare statistics effectively before and after such rule changes.  As a result, only current 
players were included in the study. 
 
Current players who have played fewer than fifty games in their careers were removed 
from the study for two reasons.  First, the fewer games an individual has played, the less 
likely it is that his statistics accurately reflect his ability.  As a player participates in more 
games, his statistics level out and it becomes easier to establish ratios such as points-per-
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game over a long-term career.  Eliminating players who have played fewer than fifty 
games removes all rookie players and players who have been in the NHL only 
sporadically (those called up from minor leagues to fill in for NHL affiliates because of 
injuries during the season).  Rookies and sporadic players typically have lower salaries 
that vary little depending on their ability.  As is true with most jobs, a player’s salary 
ultimately becomes a reflection of his success and of the contribution he provides to his 
team, but this doesn’t happen immediately.  Coaches and managers must witness a 
player’s ability at the professional level consistently before they offer him a salary 
reflective of his skill.  For these reasons, players who have played in fewer than fifty 
games were eliminated from the sample. 
 
5.2  Enforcers 
Determining which players are enforcers can be difficult—many players are both talented 
goal scorers and aggressive checkers.  However, skilled players are typically prevented 
from fighting by their own team, since the risk of losing a goal-scorer or playmaker to a 
broken hand from fighting is a major reason for having designated enforcers on each 
team.  Since an enforcer’s job necessitates fighting, we compiled a list of all the players 
who participated in at least one fight in the most recent season.  (One season’s data alone 
is sufficient because an enforcer must get in fights regularly to fulfill his role.  Any 
enforcers in our sample set of current players with more than fifty games of experience 
would have been in a fight the previous season.)  However, because establishing a cut-off 
number of fights to determine an enforcer is arbitrary, we chose two alternative cut-off 
points.  By looking at these two different samples and comparing the regression results, 
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we can identify similarities and also see if the number of fights an enforcer engages in 
has a large impact on his salary.   
 
We first chose players who had participated in at least four fights last season as enforcers.  
(Since skilled players can occasionally be goaded into fights or have to “answer the call” 
as part of the self-imposed hockey code for delivering a big hit to an opposing team’s star 
player, many players participate in one or two fights a season without being enforcers.) 
This method weeds out most skilled players, but there are still some players whose high 
levels of aggression lead them to engage in more than four fights.  As a result, we chose a 
second cut-off point of ten fights.  A manual examination of the list of players who 
engaged in ten or more fights last season reveals only those players definitely known 
primarily as enforcers. 
 
5.3  French Canadians 
In order to follow-up the Jones and Walsh (1988) and Lavoie (2002, 2003) studies on 
discrimination against French-Canadian NHL players accurately, we used the same 
method to identify French-Canadian players:  players born in the province of Quebec, 
Canada.  
 
5.4 Statistics 
Certain statistics carry more weight in determining the value of a player depending on his 
position either as a forward or as a defender.  While we ran the same regressions for all 
players, we divided the sample into forwards and defenders, and compared enforcers and 
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skilled players in each of these groups. The variables used for the regressions are 
discussed below, with attention given to the effect of each variable on both forwards and 
defenders. 
 
Charts 1a through 1h plot goals-per-game against penalty minutes-per-game for enforcer 
defenders, skilled player defenders, enforcer forwards, and skilled player forwards.  The 
results demonstrate the key difference between skilled players and enforcers:  skilled 
players—particularly at the forward position—consistently have higher goals-per-game 
ratios and lower penalty minutes-per-game ratios than enforcers.  In addition, 
examination of the trendlines reveals slopes of different signs:  forward enforcers see a 
drastic drop in their goals-per-game as penalty-minutes-per-game increases while skilled 
players see a positive correlation between the two.  This relationship can be explained by 
the different implications of penalty minutes for enforcers and skilled players.  Skilled 
players with more penalty minutes typically play a more aggressive and intense style of 
hockey; their intensity leads them to accrue more unintentional penalties, but also helps 
them create more scoring opportunities.  For enforcers, penalty minutes typically 
represent a more aggressive playing style as well.  However, aggressive enforcers focus 
more on fighting and checking opponents (therefore intentionally earning penalties), 
limiting their scoring chances and leading to fewer goals.  The same difference can be 
seen in defenders, but to a lesser extent.  The smaller disparity among defenders is not 
surprising:  defenders score fewer goals than forwards regardless of their playing styles 
and defenders commonly commit minor penalties (such as hooking and slashing) 
intentionally to slow down opposing players on breakaways and deny goal-scoring 
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opportunities.  The meaning of penalty minutes for different groups of players is 
elaborated on in section 5.44, where the relationship with a player’s salary is examined in 
more depth.   
 
Tables 1a through 1d and 2a through 2d summarize all the variables being examined, and 
divide up the sample groups for comparison.  They also show the correlation between 
each variable and the salaries of players within that sample group.  For the purposes of 
this study, it is important to note the differences in average salary for different player 
groups.  When we use a cut-off of four fights the previous season to define an enforcer, 
the difference between the mean salaries of skilled players and enforcers is not significant 
at a ten percent level for either forwards or defenders.  However, when we use ten fights 
as the cut-off for an enforcer, there is a statistically significant difference in the mean 
salaries for skilled players and enforcers.  For forwards, the difference in mean salaries is 
significant at a five percent level.  For defenders, it is significant at a one percent level.  
This suggests that enforcers who do an excessive amount of fighting are less valuable, 
possibly because their fighting ability comes at the expense of other skills—such as the 
ability to score goals.  Because enforcers tend to spend much less time on the ice than 
skilled players, a comparison of this nature for time on ice as a dependent variable would 
not be an appropriate comparison for enforcers and skilled players.  The regression 
analysis (examined under “Empirical Findings”) provides a better comparison by 
assessing which variables have a statistically-significant impact on determining a player’s 
time on ice.  A more detailed explanation of the key variables that impact player salaries 
and ice time follows.  
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5.41  Games Played and Games Played Squared 
Games played (GP) and games played squared (GPSQ) represent the NHL 
experience of each player.  Because salaries are often based on experience, we must 
examine the effect of games played on salary.  Games played squared is included to 
assess the “point of diminishing returns.”  In other words, can players be too 
experienced?  We expect games played squared to have a negative coefficient for 
both salary and time on ice because players become less valuable as they pass a 
certain age and are no longer in their physical prime (this is true for time on ice in 
particular, as older players are less physically capable of playing for extended 
durations). 
 
It is worth noting that the level of experience has more of an effect on the salaries of 
skilled players than on enforcers.  Skilled players typically see their salaries increase 
steadily as they reach their prime, accruing more goals and assists each season.  
Because of the difficulty of transitioning to the NHL from minor leagues or colleges, 
salaries of many skilled players don’t peak until they have played professionally for 
five or six years.  In addition, the peak is short-lived:  as players age, they become 
slower and more injury prone, lowering their scoring potential. 
 
Enforcers, on the other hand, vary little in their performance ability over time.  An 
enforcer’s value stems from his grit and aggressiveness—traits which can be present 
when players first enter the league and which continue (and sometimes grow) as 
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players age.  The most likely reason for an enforcer’s NHL experience to affect his 
salary is the reputation he develops.  Reputations precede players and a well-known 
enforcer might be able to deter opponents from hitting his teammates simply because 
of his reputation.  As a result, we expect both games played and games played 
squared to have a larger impact on the salaries of skilled players.   
 
5.42  Points 
Points—an accumulation of both goals and assists for a player over his entire 
career—also has a profound effect on salary determination.  The abilities of many 
players (particularly forwards) are often measured solely by their career points.  For 
example, Wayne Gretzky is widely considered to be the best NHL player of all time, 
and is probably the only hockey player known by name to people who do not follow 
the sport.  Gretzky has nearly one thousand points more than the second-place all-
time leader, Mark Messier.  The top ten all-time leaders in points are collectively 
considered some of the best players to ever play in the NHL1.  Career points are 
therefore a large factor in determining a player’s salary, as seen in charts 2a through 
2d.  All four groups of players have an upward-sloping trendline when we plot 
player salary against career points.  Points should also have a significant impact on 
the playing time of both skilled players and enforcers:  any player with a high ability 
to score will be given more ice time than his peers in order to maximize his 
opportunity to score goals. 
                                                
1 Wayne Gretzky (2,857), Mark Messier (1,887), Gordie Howe (1,850), Ron Francis (1,798), Marcel Dionne 
(1,771), Steve Yzerman (1,755), Mario Lemieux (1,723), Joe Sakic (1,641), Jaromir Jagr (1,612), and Phil Esposito 
(1,590) are the top ten all-points leaders in the NHL (The National Hockey League). 
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5.43  Plus-Minus 
Plus-minus is a statistic typically used to measure the skill of defensive players.  
Since defensive players tend not to score as many goals, and record fewer assists 
than forwards, their point totals seem low in comparison to those of forwards.  
However, plus-minus reflects a defender’s ability to protect his own goal and 
support his team’s scoring ability by keeping his team on offense.  We expect plus-
minus to have more impact on the salaries of defenders than on the salaries of 
forwards.  As with points however, enforcers’ salaries will be less-effected by their 
plus-minus due to the way in which enforcers function on their teams. 
 
We expect plus-minus to have a significant impact on the ice time of forwards in 
particular.  Because plus-minus is used to measure a player’s defensive ability, a 
high plus-minus for a forward may contribute to his selection for his team’s penalty 
kill unit, contributing to his total ice time per game.  As with salary, defenders are 
expected to have an average ice time dependent, in large part, on their plus-minus, as 
it is often indicative of which players are considered the best defensemen. 
 
5.44  Penalty Minutes 
A player’s total for penalty minutes is often valued differently depending upon the 
player’s role.  For a skilled player, penalty minutes represent the player’s aggression 
and intensity on the ice; playing with a higher intensity or levels of aggression often 
results in more accidental penalties (minor penalties such as hooking, tripping, and 
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slashing).  For skilled players, we expect penalty minutes to have a positive 
correlation with salary, although skilled players who commit too many penalties and 
spend too much time in the penalty box limit their own scoring chances and become 
less valuable to the team.  Despite this delicate balance, there is no clear “sweet 
spot” that identifies the value of a skilled player’s penalty minutes, though we expect 
a positive coefficient for penalty minutes. 
 
For enforcers, penalty minutes is perhaps the most important statistic.  Just as career 
points are the key measure of a skilled player’s ability, penalty minutes reveal 
whether an enforcer is doing his job:  engaging in fights and checking opponents—
the two major roles of enforcers—yield high penalty minute totals.  One of the 
league’s most famous enforcers, Marty McSorley, is fourth in all-time career penalty 
minutes2.  Because of the importance of penalty minutes in assessing enforcers, we 
anticipate a positive coefficient for penalty minutes in the regressions of player 
salaries. 
 
The effect of penalty minutes on ice time is much more complex.  Although penalty 
minutes might reflect an enforcer’s tenacity and result in more ice time, it is 
important to remember than penalty minutes are minutes spent off the ice.  For every 
fight an enforcer is in, he spends at least five minutes in the penalty box.  As a result, 
we expect penalty minutes to have a negative coefficient for players when examining 
time on ice, regardless of their position and playing style. 
                                                
2 Dave Williams (3,966), Dale Hunter (3,565), Tie Domie (3,515), Marty McSorley (3,381), and Bob Probert 
(3,300) are the top five all-time leaders in penalty minutes.  All were feared as top enforcers in their day (The 
National Hockey League). 
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5.45  Height and Weight  
Although height and weight do not directly correspond to a player’s success in the 
NHL, they are relevant to NHL players because of the physical nature of the game.  
For enforcers in particular, height has a significant impact:  in addition to 
intimidating other players, height typically means longer reach, which—in turn—
makes enforcers better fighters.  The better a fighter someone is, the more people 
fear fighting him, and the less his teammates are targeted by opposing teams.  
Weight has a similar effect.  However, while height and weight are essential for 
enforcers, they are still beneficial attributes for skilled players:  the bigger the player, 
the harder it is for opposing teams to push him around.  As a result, we do not 
anticipate a large disparity in the effect of the height and weight variables on 
enforcers and skilled players.   
 
Moreover, like games played, height and weight have a point of diminishing returns 
(taller players tend to be less talented skaters and heavier players are often slow 
skaters).  To measure this, we included height squared (HTSQ) and weight squared 
(WTSQ) in our regressions.  Because these attributes become harmful after a certain 
point, we expect a positive coefficient for height and weight, but a negative 
coefficient for height squared and weight squared. 
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6.  Empirical Findings 
6.1  Salary Determinants for Different Player Roles 
Tables 3 and 4 contrast the Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) estimates for skilled players 
and enforcers (with enforcers defined as players participating in at least four fights in the 
2010-2011 season and at least ten fights in the 2010-2011 season).  These tables show the 
results of regressions for the four different groups of players, dividing both forwards and 
defenders into skilled players and enforcers.  In Table 4, the OLS estimates for enforcers 
at the defender position are omitted because of collinearity:  only four defenders 
participated in ten or more fights during that season, making our sample size too small to 
provide useable results.  This does reveal a tendency for enforcers to exist at the forward 
position.  Since NHL teams dress twelve forwards and six defensemen for each game, 
losing defensemen to penalties (and potential misconducts and game ejections) is more 
costly to a team than losing a forward. 
 
There were a few commonalities across all the regressions.  Points-per-game (PPG) is 
statistically significant at the one percent level in all seven regressions, and the high 
coefficients (ranging from 2.1 to 2.6) demonstrate the value of a player’s ability to 
contribute goals and assists to the success of his team.   
 
Games played (GP) and games played squared (GPSQ) are also significant across all the 
regressions, with two important results.  First, as predicted, games played has a positive 
coefficient while games played squared has a negative coefficient.  This supports the 
 30 
hypothesis that players become more valuable as they gain NHL experience, but they do 
reach a peak after which experience (probably reflecting age) hinders their ability and 
contributes to their decreasing market value in the NHL.  Second, games played and 
games played squared were less significant at the five and ten percent level, respectively, 
for enforcers engaging in ten or more fights than for all other player groups.  This 
supports our prediction that the most active enforcers are valued more for their tenacity 
and willingness to fight than for their experience.  However, experience still offers value 
by means of reputation, though (as with skilled players) too much experience reduces 
value.   
 
There are a few important differences between forwards and defenders, so we’ll examine 
the results for the two groups separately, starting with forwards.  Defining enforcers as 
players who participated in at least four fights, the only additional variable that is 
statistically significant in determining the player’s salary is plus-minus (+/-).  It is not, 
however, statistically significant for skilled players.  Since plus-minus is typically used to 
assess defenders, it could perhaps reflect a tendency for managers to view enforcers as 
defensive players, even when they play at the forward position.  These results thus 
suggest that enforcers provide value without recording goals and assists; they have a 
defensive impact.  This supports the findings of Moskowitz and Wertheim that an 
enforcer’s ability to intimidate his opponents can mitigate the impact of opposing teams’ 
star players, diminishing their ability to score goals.   
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While plus-minus is not significant for skilled forwards, weight and weight squared are 
both significant at the five percent level.  Although we incorrectly predicted that physical 
attributes would not significantly affect players with different playing styles to the same 
degree, the importance of weight for skilled players is in line with our predictions.  The 
positive coefficient of weight for skilled forwards demonstrates the need for muscle and 
bulk so that opposing players cannot easily push the forwards around.  This, in turn, gives 
the forwards greater opportunity to capitalize on their scoring abilities.  At the same time, 
the negative coefficient of weight squared reflects the importance of attributes like speed 
and skating ability for many goal-scorers—qualities that tend to diminish as players get 
heavier. 
 
Interestingly, the significant variables among forwards differ when we define enforcers as 
players who participated in ten or more fights the previous season.  In that case, penalty 
minutes (PIM), not plus-minus, is statistically significant.  Perhaps this is the result of 
differences between agitators and energy lines and enforcers.  Agitators and players 
playing on energy lines are characterized by aggressive play.  Their willingness to check 
players—often opposing skilled players in an attempt to get them “off their game”—
requires agitator and energy line players to accept opponents’ challenges to fight based 
on the Code.  This could cause many agitators and energy players to engage in just over 
four fights in a season; however, such a playing style would probably not lead these 
players to participate in ten or more fights in a season.  The different cutoffs might 
capture players of slightly different playing styles as a result.  Since agitators and players 
on energy lines tend to have more skilled attributes than enforcers, they might be valued 
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more based upon their plus-minus.  When looking only at players engaging in ten or more 
fights, we examined only the most persistent enforcers in the league.  These players’ 
value stems more directly from their willingness to fight, and their career penalty minutes 
(which increases significantly for every five-minute fighting major) offer managers the 
best way to measure this willingness. 
 
For defenders, the only statistically significant variable other than points-per-game, 
games played, and games played squared is penalty minutes.  However, unlike for 
forward enforcers, the coefficient for penalty minutes is negative for defender enforcers.  
Since the higher number of forwards in a team’s lineup makes forwards more disposable, 
managers would prefer that their forwards take penalties, not their defenders.  Perhaps the 
value of enforcers at the defender position is reflected in the fact that plus-minus is not 
statistically significant at even the ten percent level for enforcers, but is significant at the 
one percent level for skilled players, suggesting that the traditional method of assessing a 
defender’s ability by examining his plus-minus ratio does not adequately reflect the 
ability of enforcers. 
 
Finally, we compared the salaries of enforcers on Canadian teams to those of enforcers 
on American Teams (see Table 5).  For both thresholds—four fights and ten fights—of 
determining enforcers, there was no statistically-significant difference between the 
salaries of enforcers playing for teams in different locations above a ten percent level.  
Even though Jones, Ferguson, and Stewart (1993, 1996) might have found a stronger link 
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between physical play and ticket sales for teams located in the US, the relative ability of 
enforcers playing in different countries to attract fans is not reflected in a salary disparity.  
 
6.2  Time on Ice Determinants for Different Player Roles 
Tables 6 and 7 contrast the OLS estimates for skilled players and enforcers when using 
time on ice as the dependent variable for the regressions.  (As with salaries, the OLS 
estimates for enforcers at the defender position are omitted when using ten fights as the 
threshold for enforcers because of collinearity.)  Tables 6 and 7 reveal an interesting 
contrast between salary and time on ice for skilled forwards:  while salary was not 
affected by the plus-minus statistics, the plus-minus statistic is statistically significant in 
determining a player’s time on ice (at a ten percent level with a threshold of four fights, 
and a five percent level with a threshold of ten fights).  However, the coefficient for plus-
minus was negative, despite our prediction of a positive coefficient.  This is perhaps 
attributable to the defensive role given to forwards with a high plus-minus.  Since many 
forwards with a high plus-minus are valued for their defensive role, they play in 
specialized situations—such as the penalty kill—but are given less total ice time than 
other forwards who are more capable of scoring goals for the team.  However, while 
plus-minus was statistically significant for the salaries of forward enforcers, it was not 
significant in determining the ice time of such players.  In fact, only points-per-game was 
statistically significant at a one percent level for forward enforcers.  (Games played and 
games played squared were significant at a ten percent level using the four-fight 
threshold, but were not significant when using ten fights as a threshold.)  This suggests 
that an enforcer’s time on ice is affected primarily but his capacity to score goals in 
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addition to his traditional role as a fighter.  However, ice time for forward enforcers—
unlike salary—is virtually unaffected by other variables.   
 
Plus-minus also had a smaller impact on the ice time of defenders—both skilled players 
and enforcers—than on their salaries.  Plus-minus was statistically significant for skilled 
defenders at a ten percent level using the four-fight threshold for enforcers, but was not 
significant at the ten-fight threshold and was not significant for enforcers at either 
threshold.  These results—in combination with the regression analysis for player 
salaries—suggest that plus-minus has become a standard measure of a defender’s 
economic value to a team, but that it has a limited effect on a player’s time on ice per 
game.  It is possible that the smaller numbers of defenders on a team (typically six 
dressed defenders compared to twelve dressed forwards) necessitates more playing time 
for each defensive pair, and that each pair has a similar strategic role.  This is in line with 
the traditional division of forward lines into two scoring lines, one checking line, and one 
energy line, a distinction that necessitates different average ice times for players on the 
different lines. 
 
6.3  No Discrimination Against French-Canadian Players 
The results of the regressions also reveal an interesting result about discrimination 
towards French Canadian players.  Only one regression—forward enforcers—had a 
statistically significant coefficient for the French Canadian dummy variable.  However, 
since there was only one French Canadian forward in the sample who had engaged in 
four or more fights, we cannot accept the result as universally true.  (It merits noting that 
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the coefficient for this player was positive, suggesting that even if we did accept the 
results, there certainly isn’t discrimination against French Canadian players.)  Although 
our results did not support our hypothesis that differences in the determinants of salaries 
for skilled players and enforcers could explain the disparity in French-Canadian player 
salaries, we were correct in predicting that using more recent player data would produce 
different results from those reported by Jones, Walsh, and Lavoie. 
 
To follow up Jones, Walsh, and Lavoie’s studies, however, we examined data for French 
Canadian defensemen.  In our study, there was never a statistically significant coefficient 
for the French Canadian dummy variable among defensemen, suggesting that salary 
discrimination does not exist.  This can probably be attributed to two factors.  First, the 
previous studies used data that was too old to include the plus-minus variable.  Since our 
data from the 2010-2011 season looked at plus-minus (and found it to be statistically 
significant at the one percent level), plus-minus might provide a better way to assess a 
defenseman’s ability.  The prevalence of the plus-minus to evaluate defensemen in the 
NHL today might make it easier to evaluate players on an equal scale, minimizing salary 
discrimination.  As a result, the previous studies would have suffered from omitted 
variable bias, skewing the results.  Second, it is possible that salary discrimination 
towards French Canadian players has disappeared from the NHL over time.  Lavoie’s 
study was the most recent to examine discrimination, and his most recent data was from 
1994.  Changes in the game and in the way discrimination is tolerated and perceived 
likely occurred during the last sixteen years, leading to the disappearance of any salary 
discrimination against French Canadian’s that might have existed in the past.  
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7.  Conclusion 
The objective of this research was to investigate the effect of fighting on player salaries and ice 
time in the National Hockey League and to use the results to expand upon previous studies that 
indicated salary discrimination against French Canadian players.  To do this, we analyzed the 
impact of different variables on the salaries and ice times of skilled players and enforcers in the 
NHL.  We collected salary information of current NHL players from the National Hockey 
League Players Association and ice times from the National Hockey League and regressed the 
data on career statistics of those players provided by the NHL’s website. 
 
The results of the regressions supported our hypothesis that enforcers are valued differently from 
skilled players.  Although total points were a significant determinant of salary and ice time for all 
players, different variables suggested that NHL managers recognize the way different playing 
styles provide value to teams and measure the abilities of different types of players accordingly.   
 
Perhaps most interesting was our conclusion about the absence of salary discrimination against 
French Canadian players.  Our regressions did not find statistically significant coefficients for the 
French Canadian dummy variable, contradicting the findings of previous studies and suggesting 
that discrimination does not exist.  This was likely due to our addition of the plus-minus statistic 
that is now used to assess the ability of defensemen, though it might merely reflect a change in 
discrimination within the NHL in the sixteen years since Lavoie’s study.   
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The results of this study raise a few questions for future consideration.  In regards to 
discrimination, it would be interesting to find historical data for player salaries over the past 
sixteen years and run regressions for each year.  This might reveal a gradual change in 
discrimination, measured either by changes in the coefficients or by changes in statistical 
significance.  This would support the premise that NHL salary discrimination against French 
Canadian defensemen—although prevalent in the 1980s and 1990s—has gradually faded.  The 
absence of such a result suggests that the change might be due to the introduction of the plus-
minus statistic just after Jones and Walsh’s study, giving NHL managers a more consistent way 
of valuing defensemen. 
 
It would also be interesting to study teams’ breakdowns of player salaries to examine each 
team’s resource allocation towards different player types.  Looking for commonalities across the 
NHL would highlight the importance teams place on having a variety of roles filled, rather than 
accumulating a star-studded roster.  This would be an additional extension of the analysis in 
Moskowitz and Wertheim’s second study, suggesting that teams perform better with one star 
player and a number of merely good players in different supporting roles.  
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Appendix 
Chart 1a:   
Relationship of goals-per-game and penalty minutes for enforcers at the defender position. 
 
 
 
 
 Chart 1b:    
Relationship of goals-per-game and penalty minutes for skilled players at the defender 
position. 
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Chart 1c:   
Relationship of goals-per-game and penalty minutes for enforcers at the forward position. 
 
 
 
 
Chart 1d:   
Relationship of goals-per-game and penalty minutes for skilled players at the forward 
position. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
!"!!#!"!$#
!"%!#!"%$#
!"&!#!"&$#
!"'!#!"'$#
!"!!# %"!!# &"!!# '"!!# ("!!# $"!!# )"!!#
!
"!
#
$
#%&"!#$
!"!!#!"%!#
!"&!#!"'!#
!"(!#!"$!#
!")!#!"*!#
!"!!# !"$!# %"!!# %"$!# &"!!# &"$!#
!
"!
#
$
#%&"!#$
 42 
 
Chart 1e:   
Relationship of goals-per-game and penalty minutes for enforcers at the defender position 
(threshold of ten fights for enforcers). 
 
 
 
 Chart 1f:    
Relationship of goals-per-game and penalty minutes for skilled players at the defender 
position (threshold of ten fights for enforcers). 
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Chart 1g:   
Relationship of goals-per-game and penalty minutes for enforcers at the forward position 
(threshold of ten fights for enforcers). 
 
 
 
Chart 1h:   
Relationship of goals-per-game and penalty minutes for skilled players at the forward 
position (threshold of ten fights for enforcers). 
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Chart 2a:   
The effect of points on player salary for enforcers at the defender position.  
 
            
 
 Chart 2b:    
The effect of points on player salary for skilled players at the defender position.  
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Chart 2c:   
The effect of points on player salary for enforcers at the forward position. 
 
 
 
Chart 2d:   
The effect of points on player salary for skilled players at the forward position. 
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Chart 2e:   
The effect of points on player salary for enforcers at the defender position (threshold of ten 
fights for enforcers). 
 
            
*Note that Career Points is not scaled here; Charts 2a-d and 2f-g measure Career Points in hundreds. 
 
 
 Chart 2f:    
The effect of points on player salary for skilled players at the defender position (threshold 
of ten fights for enforcers).  
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Chart 2g:   
The effect of points on player salary for enforcers at the forward position (threshold of ten 
fights for enforcers). 
 
 
 
Chart 2h:   
The effect of points on player salary for skilled players at the forward position (threshold 
of ten fights for enforcers). 
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